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Abstract—This paper presents a replay attack detection
method that addresses the performance loss of watermarking-
based approaches. The proposed method injects a sinusoidal
signal that affects a subset, chosen at random, of the system
outputs. The presence of the signal in each one of the outputs
is estimated by means of independent observers and its effect
is compensated in the control loop. When a system output
is affected by a replay attack, the loss of feedback of the
associated observer destabilizes the signal estimation, leading
to an exponential increase of the estimation error up to a
threshold, above which the estimated signal compensation in
the control loop is disabled. This event triggers the detection of
a replay attack over the output corresponding to the disrupted
observer. The effectiveness of the method is demonstrated using
results obtained with a quadruple-tank system simulator.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ongoing advances in electronics and information
technologies have improved the connection between
computational and physical elements, allowing to shift from
traditional networks to more complex cyber-physical systems
(CPS), aiming for a better resource management. These
systems integrate interconnected subsystems that interact
through control, communication, and computation. Among
the applications of CPSs, there are critical infrastructures
like water and gas supply systems, smart grids or nuclear
facilities, such that guaranteeing their safe operation has
converted into a critical issue.
The advantages in efficiency and adaptability brought
by CPSs, come at the price of new vulnerabilities and
security weaknesses that could be exploited by a malicious
attacker [1]. Examples like [2], [3] demonstrated the severe
repercussions that attacks to CPSs could entail to society,
attracting the attention of the scientific community, in an
attempt to model, detect and repel possible attacks against
CPSs. In the attack classification proposed in [4], attacks are
characterized in a three dimensional attack space, depending
on the attacker’s a priori knowledge of the system model,
and his/her access to the disruption and disclosure resources.
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Replay attacks can be easily placed within that framework, as
according to [5], are used by an attacker who does not have
knowledge about the system dynamics, apart from the fact
that the system itself will be in steady state during the attack.
Standard replay attacks are modeled as a two phase
attack: i) the attacker records data from the sensors without
disturbing the system, and ii) the attacker replays back the
recorded data to the monitor center, while conducting an
attack on the physical system. In order to address this attack,
two different strategies arise: the design of control strategies
resilient to replay attacks, or the replay attack detection
problem. However, the assumptions of limited energy of the
attacker in the first strategy [6], [7], has brought the focus
to the latter problem.
Among the most common methods for replay attack
detection, there are the watermarking-based approaches,
where an authentication signal is added to the control loop,
at the cost of sacrificing the control performance. The used
watermarking signals vary: [5] has used an independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian distribution to
generate the signal; [8] has proposed to employ a periodic
watermarking strategy; the watermark proposed by [9] aims
at destabilizing the residual of the system, while preserving
the stability of the main system; and in [10], a sinusoidal
signal with a time-varying frequency is proposed as possible
signature. Also, alternative methods that try to detect the
replay attacks without injecting signals in the control input
have been proposed (see [11] , [12]).
The main contribution of this paper is to present a novel
strategy to detect replay attacks that addresses the problem
of performance loss shared by state-of-the-art watermarking
methods. This detection methodology can be framed within
a state machine framework, in the sense that a mode switch
from the nominal mode to a system under replay attack
mode is triggered when some conditions are met. The
detection method is developed for square systems, and it
is based on injecting into the control loop a sinusoidal
signal that affects a subset, chosen at random, of the system
outputs. By means of a cascade of observers, each one
fed independently with one different output, the presence
of the injected signal is estimated and its effect on the
control loop compensated. When a system output is affected
by a replay attack, the loss of feedback of the associated
observer destabilizes the estimation, boosted by the error
induced after a change in the injected signal. The estimation
error will increase exponentially up to a threshold, which is
considered as the trigger event for the aforementioned mode
switch, such that the signal compensation is disabled.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion 2 formulates the proposed detection method. In Section
3, the different modes are characterized. Section 4 presents
the application to an example based on a quadruple-tank.
Throughout Section 5, the results obtained in simulation are
analyzed. Finally, the main conclusions are drawn in Section
6.
II. REPLAY ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, the replay attack detection method is
formulated. We describe first the injection of the authen-
tication signals and, afterwards, the signal estimation and
compensation.
A. Injected signal
Let us consider a linear time-invariant (LTI) system:
x˙p(t) = Apxp(t)+Bpup(t)
yp(t) =Cpxp(t)
(1)
where xp(t) ∈ Rnx is the vector of state variables, up(t) ∈
Rnu is the control action, and Ap, Bp, Cp are matrices of
appropriate dimensions. The vector yp(t)∈Rny , is the vector
of measurements sent to a supervision center. A square
system is assumed in this work, i.e. nu = ny. The system
(1) is stabilized by means of a state-feedback control law
up(t) =−Kxp(t) (2)
Hence, the closed-loop system behavior is modeled as
x˙p(t) = (Ap−BpK)xp(t) (3)
A sinusoidal wave at a fixed frequency d(t) = ρ∗ sin(ω∗t),
is injected in the control loop, such that it affects a subset
of the system outputs chosen following a random pattern.
In order to achieve this, a decoupler must be designed, such
that the presence of the signal in a specific plant output
is achieved by applying the signal in the corresponding
decoupler input.
For the design of the aforementioned decoupler, the
closed-loop steady state response to a persistent sinusoidal
at frequency ω∗ can be characterized by the system transfer
matrix calculated at s = jω∗:
Gp( jω∗) =Cp( jω∗I−Ap+BpK)−1Bp (4)
Then, the matrix Gd that input-output decouples the sys-
tem in amplitude at the given frequency (ω∗), can be directly
computed as
||Gp( jω∗)||Gd = I → Gd = ||Gp( jω∗)||−1 (5)
The inputs affected by the sinusoidal signal can be mod-
eled as a pseudo-random generated binary code z(t), with
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zi ∈ {0,1}, whose values vary with a switching period of
Ts. Hence, the elements zi(t), are piecewise functions that
take binary values 0 or 1 at equally-spaced time instants t( j)s ,
j ∈ N, with t(0)s = 0 and t( j+1)s − t( j)s = Ts:
z(t) =
[
z1(t) , · · · , zny(t)]T (6)
Knowing that the state space representation of a sinusoidal
wave with frequency ω∗ has the form
x˙d(t) = Adxd(t)
d(t) =Cdxd(t)
(7)
with
Ad =
[
0 ω∗
−ω∗ 0
]
Cd =
[
c0 c1
]
(8)
then, the state space representation of the system plant
affected by the injection of the sinusoidal signal (see Fig.
1), yields to the following switched system[
x˙p(t)
x˙d(t)
]
=
[
Ap−BpK BpGdz(t)Cd
0 Ad
][
xp(t)
xd(t)
]
(9)
in which z(t) acts as a switching signal.
B. Signal estimation
The presence of the injected signal d(t) (see (7)) in each
of the system outputs, is estimated analyzing each output
independently. For this purpose, a cascade of state observers
is designed such that the ith observer is only fed by the
system output yip(t). Thus, each observer is able to estimate
only the trajectory in the subspace of the state-space which
is observable with the considered system output, plus the
sinusoidal signal in case it affects the output by means of
the random code z(t).
The input-output decoupling property, i.e. the fact that
when the code z(t) introduces the signal d(t) through the
ith input of the decoupler Gd (zi(t) = 1), this signal will be
observable only through the ith output of the plant, being
impossible to estimate its states through any other output,
follows from the same definition of observability [13].
According to the described procedure, in the design of the
ith observer, only the corresponding row (Cip) of the system
output matrix Cp will be taken into consideration. Then,
in the general case, the observability matrix Oi = [Ap,Cip]
will have rank(Oi) = mi < nx. A similarity transformation
ξi = Tixp can be performed [13], such that the mi observable
states, ξoi in the new base, are independent from the (nx−mi)
non-observable ones ξo¯i. The proposed Kalman decomposi-
tion has the form[
ξ˙oi
ξ˙o¯i
]
=
[
Aoi 0
A21i Ao¯i
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A˜i
[
ξoi
ξo¯i
]
+
[
Boi
Bo¯i
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B˜i
up
y =
[
Coi 0
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
C˜i
[
ξoi
ξo¯i
] (10)
where
A˜i = TiApT−1i B˜i = TiBp C˜i =C
i
pT
−1
i (11)
Besides, taking into consideration the imposed input-
output relationship of the sinusoidal signal d(t), done by
means of the matrix Gd , a vector ti can be defined with the
following form
ti =
[
δ1i , · · · , δii , · · · , δnyi
]T (12)
where δi j represents the Kronecker delta. Thus, the ith state
observer fed with the yip(t) output, as shown in Fig. 1, has
the form
[
˙ˆξoi
˙ˆxdi
]
=
[
Aoi BoiGdtiCd
0 Ad
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A′i
[
ξˆoi
xˆdi
]
+
[
Boi
0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B′i
u+Li(yip−Coiξˆoi) (13)
By designing a matrix Li = [L
p
i |Ldi ]T that stabilizes (A′i−
LiC′i), then dˆi(t) =Cd xˆdi→ zi(t)d(t) = zi(t)Cdxd(t).
C. Signal compensation
According to the previous discussion, after a transient
stage caused by a change in the code z(t) at each
switching time t( j)s , the estimated set of signals
dˆ(t) = [dˆ1(t), · · · , dˆny(t)]T will match the injected signal
z(t)d(t). Hence, the estimations can be injected into the
control loop, in order to compensate for the effects of the
injection of the sinusoidal signals ruled by z(t).
As shown in Fig. 1, the initial control law is extended
with the addition of the injected signal and the injection of
the signal estimation after a decoupling block. Hence, by
defining the error in the estimation of one of the signals as
ei(t) = zi(t)d(t)− dˆi(t) (14)
then, the new control action u∗p(t) is a function of the set of
estimation errors e(t) = [e1(t), · · · ,eny(t)]T :
u∗p(t) =−Kxp(t)+Gdz(t)d(t)−Gd dˆ(t) =−Kxp(t)+Gde(t)
(15)
An estimation error ei(t) does not affect the estimation
performed by the rest of observers as both dˆi(t) and zi(t)d(t)
are sinusoidal waves at frequency ω∗ (when zi(t) = 1).
Thus, the error ei(t) is also a sinusoidal wave at frequency
ω∗ that enters the plant through the decoupler Gd (see (15)),
and hence, only affects the output yip(t).
The direct injection in the control loop of a set of estimated
signals dˆi(t) as presented in (15), may destabilize the system
when a subset of system outputs is under replay attack.
In order to limit the aforementioned harmful effect, each
estimated signal dˆi(t) is only reinjected in the control loop
if its estimation error is below a threshold αi. Then, a set of
vectors pi(t) can be defined as
pi(t) =
[
δ1iσ1(t) , · · · , δiiσi(t) , · · · , δnyiσny(t)
]T (16)
where
σi(t) =
{
1, if ei(t)< αi.
0, otherwise.
(17)
The introduction of the switching elements σi leads to
define the control law affecting the plant as
u∗p(t) =−Kxp(t)+Gdz(t)d(t)−Gd
ny
∑
i=1
pi(t)dˆi(t) (18)
that will match (15) when the compensations of all the
estimated signals are enabled (σi = 1, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,ny}).
III. SYSTEM MODES
In this section, the nominal mode and the system under
replay attack mode are characterized. Also, the triggering
event that indicates the transition from the first to the latter
is studied.
A. Nominal mode
For the nominal mode, i.e. when the system is not under
attack and all the estimated signals are compensated in the
control loop (σi = 1, ∀ i ∈ {1, ...,ny}), the estimation errors
defined in (14) tend to zero (e(t)→ 0). Hence, the system
output is the same as the one provided by the closed loop
system expressed by (3).
Taking into account the aforementioned estimation errors,
the overall system dynamics for a plant with ny outputs, can
be expressed as

x˙p
x˙d
˙ˆξo1
e˙1
...
˙ˆξony
e˙ny

= A

xp
xd
ξˆo1
e1
...
ξˆony
eny

(19)
where the system matrix A has the form
A =
a11 0 0 a1,k1 . . . 0 a1,kny
0 a22 0 0 . . . 0 0
a j1,1 0 a j1, j1 0 . . . 0 0
ak1,1 0 ak1, j1 ak1,k1 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
a jny ,1 0 0 0 . . . a jny , jny 0
akny ,1 0 0 0 . . . akny , jny akny ,kny

(20)
being ji = 2i+1, ki = 2i+2, and
a11 = Ap−BpK a22 = Ad
a1,ki = BpGdti a ji,1 =−BoiK+Lpi Cip
a ji, ji = Aoi−Lpi Coi aki,1 =−CdLdi Cip
aki, ji =CdL
d
i Coi aki,ki =CdAd
(21)
that yields a stable system by construction.
B. Switching mode event
For the system starting in the nominal mode, i.e. with all
the signal compensations enabled (σi = 1, ∀ i∈ {1, ...,ny}), if
a malicious attacker replaces the measurements coming from
the ith output by a serial repetition of previously recorded
measurements y¯i, then, the feedback loop that corrects the
estimation error of the ith observer is broken and the overall
system is described by
x˙p
x˙d
˙ˆξo1
e˙1
...
˙ˆξony
e˙ny

= A∗yi

xp
xd
ξˆo1
e1
...
ξˆony
eny

+

0
0
Lp1 y¯i
−CdLd1 y¯i
...
0
0

(22)
where A∗yi is obtained from A
 by replacing the terms a ji,1
and aki,1 respectively with
a∗ji,1 =−BoiK a∗ki,1 = 0 (23)
Designing the set of Li observer gains such that they do
not only stabilize each observer estimation error, but they
also fulfill the condition that for the whole set {A∗yi , i ∈
[1,ny]} each system matrix is unstable, then, whenever a
replay attack is being carried out over a system output, the
corresponding disturbance estimation will become unstable,
causing the propagation of the estimation error through
the compensation loop. Hence, the corresponding estimation
error ei(t) will increase up to reach the threshold defined in
(17), leading to disable the ith signal compensation, by setting
σi = 0. This event will trigger the detection of a replay attack
affecting the ith output, and drives the system into the system
under replay attack mode.
C. System under replay attack mode
The disconnection of the compensation of the ith estimated
signal, causes the rest of the system to become independent
from the dynamics of the ith observer. Hence, the dynamics
of the system in this mode are ruled by a new state matrix
A?ai obtained from (20) by erasing the ji and ki rows and
columns and replacing the element a12 with
a?12 = B
pGdti (24)
due to the presence of the non-compensated signal zi(t)d(t)
affecting the ith system output.
In this mode, an appropriate set of countermeasures for
protecting the system against other malicious actions masked
behind a replay attack (see [4]), should be developed, al-
though this goes beyond the scope and goal of this paper.
Note that the ith observer could still be used in order to detect
the end of the replay attack.
IV. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
In this section, the application of detection method pre-
sented in the previous sections is illustrated by considering
a quadruple-tank process controlled through a wireless com-
munication network (see [14]).
A. Quadruple-tank process
The plant model is given by [15].
dh1
dt
=− a1
A1
√
2gh1+
a3
A1
√
2gh3+
γ1k1
A1
v1
dh2
dt
=− a2
A2
√
2gh2+
a4
A2
√
2gh4+
γ2k2
A2
v2
dh3
dt
=− a3
A3
√
2gh3+
(1− γ2)k2
A3
v2
dh4
dt
=− a4
A4
√
2gh4+
(1− γ1)k1
A4
v1
(25)
where hi are the heights of water in each tank, Ai and ai
the cross-section areas of the tanks and the outlet holes
respectively, ki the pump constants, γi the flow ratios and
g the gravity. The process inputs, are v1 and v2, the input
voltages to the pumps. The list and values of the model
parameters are given in Table I.
The previous nonlinear model, can be represented by a
fourth order state space model, choosing the tank liquid
levels hi as the state variables xi, i = 1, . . . ,4. The system
is linearized for the steady-state equilibrium point xe =
[x1e,x2e,x3e,x4e]T = [12.26,12.78,1.63,1,41] [cm], reached
TABLE I
MODEL PARAMETERS
Parameter Value Units
A1,A3 28 cm2
A2,A4 32 cm2
a1,a3 0.071 cm2
a2,a4 0.057 cm2
g 981 cm/s2
k1,k2 3.33,3.35 cm3/Vs
γ1,γ2 0.7,0.6
by applying the constant input voltages ue = [v1e,v2e]T =
[3,3]T [V]. Considering the deviations of the state and input
from the equilibrium point ∆x and ∆u, the linearized system
can be expressed as
∆x˙ = A∆x+B∆u (26)
with
A =
−0.016 0 0.044 00 −0.011 0 0.0330 0 −0.044 0
0 0 0 −0.033
 B =
0.083 00 0.0630 0.048
0.032 0

(27)
and a state feedback control law ∆u = −K∆x with the
controller gain K
K =
[
36.16 −36.21 46.79 −79.07
−94.8154 130.22 −155.08 251.54
]
(28)
Throughout the rest of the paper, it is assumed that the
liquid level of the two bottom tanks is monitored by a
supervision station, leading to an output matrix
C =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
(29)
B. Detector specifications
The specification of the injected signal d(t) = ρ∗ sin(ω∗t)
in the application example is
ρ∗ = 0.02 ω∗ = 10pi rad/s (30)
For the above frequency, the amplitude decoupling matrix
Gd is
Gd =
[
377.42 −0.97
−0.69 500.28
]
(31)
For each of the two outputs defined by (29), an observer
is designed according to (13), being the obtained gains
L1 =

1.14
−16.70
31.09
31.77
 L2 =

1.15
1.37
31.19
31.71
 (32)
such that L1 and L2 fulfill the condition of destabilizing the
matrices A∗y1 ,A
∗
y2 defined in Section III-B.
The considered switching period is Ts = 150s. The thresh-
olds for the mode switch from nominal to system under
replay attack affecting the ith output are chosen as
α1 = α2 = 0.05 (33)
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to assess the effectiveness of the proposed
method, two different simulation scenarios are considered.
A. Scenario I - Nominal mode
The first scenario simulates the system behavior in the
nominal mode. Fig. 2 shows the injected signal z(t)d(t)
altogether with the corresponding estimation error that is
provided by each one of the designed observers.
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Fig. 2. System outputs - nominal mode
During the nominal mode, both estimated signals are com-
pensated in the control loop (σ1 = 1,σ2 = 1). As presented in
Fig. 3, the effect in the system outputs of the injected signals
z(t)d(t), is compensated after a transient stage induced by a
change in z(t).
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window
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Fig. 3. System outputs - nominal mode
For the system in the nominal mode, it was assumed
that a malicious attacker recorded intervals of system mea-
surements during the steady state. The considered record
windows are (see Fig. 3): y¯1 constitutes a recording of output
1 from t10 = 110s to t
1
f = 130s, and y¯2 constitutes a recording
of output 2 from t20 = 380s to t
2
f = 410s .
B. Scenario II - System under attack
In this scenario, a replay attack against the different
system outputs is simulated. The interval y¯1 is repeatedly
replayed during the time interval t ∈ [680s,780s] replacing
the real measurements of the first output, while the interval
y¯2 is replayed in the time interval t ∈ [870s,990s] instead
of the second output measurements.
Figs. 4-5 show how for both outputs, right after the replay
attack is performed, the loss of feedback of the associated
observer implies that the corresponding estimation error
increases up to reach the defined thresholds, instant when
the signal compensation is disabled (σi = 0), and hence, the
replay attack detected.
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Fig. 4. Injected / estimated signal - output 1
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The random presence of the injected signals imposed by
z(t), ensures that, under replay attack, an initial estimation
error will exist after each switch in the conditions, triggering
the divergence of the estimation error associated to the
attacked output. Nevertheless, the presence of small errors
even in the steady state, causes the immediate increase in
the corresponding estimation error seen in Figs. 4-5.
As commented in Section III-C, when the system is in
the system under replay attack mode affecting the ith output,
the capability of correctly estimating the injected signal
zi(t)d(t) (when zi(t) = 1) by the associated observer, could
be used in order to detect the end of the attack. Figs. 4-5,
also include (in green) the obtained end of attack detection
times, computed when the corresponding estimation error
ei(t)≈ 0 for zi(t) = 1.
The mean absolute tracking errors (MAE) in the nominal
mode presented in the first scenario, and the detection times
obtained for the proposed attacks, are shown in Table II.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This work has introduced a novel method for detecting
replay attacks as a consequence of the feedback loss of the
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE
MAE (cm) Attack (s) Attack detection (s)
output 1 2.62 ·10−4 [680 , 780] 684.16
output 2 2.36 ·10−4 [870 , 990] 874.39
observer associated to the output under attack, proving its
effectiveness in a quadruple-tank system. Simulations have
shown how in the nominal mode, the compensation of the
estimated signal in the control loop reduces the performance
loss of the plant. On the other hand, whenever a system
output is under attack, the estimation error ends up diverging
due to the appropriate choice of observer gains. The design
of the observer gains such that the previous condition of
instability is achieved, is a future research direction.
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